Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan
Profile
The Taliban began as an armed group in the 1990s out of Afghanistan’s civil war. By 1996, they ruled most of the country and established the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. In 2001, U.S., international, and Afghan forces deposed them, and the group soon began a twenty-year insurgency. The Taliban entered direct talks with the U.S. in 2018. In February 2020, the two sides struck the Doha peace deal, forcing the U.S. to withdraw from Afghanistan and the Taliban to enter intra-Afghan negotiations with the western-backed Afghan government. However, the intra-Afghan negotiations failed and in August 2021, the group took over Afghanistan through military force, swiftly collapsing the western-backed government. The group is led by its supreme leader Haibatullah Akhundzada who assumed the position in 2016. He is supported by three deputies: Sirajuddin Haqqani (son of Haqqani Network founder Jalaluddin Haqqani), Mohammad Yaqoob (son of Taliban founder Mullah Omar), and Abdul Ghani Baradar - in essence, representing the three different factions of the Taliban. All three have prominent positions in the 2021 Taliban government as acting minister of interior, acting minister of defense, and acting first deputy prime minister, respectively.
Structure
The group is led by the Rahbari Shura (leadership council), also known as the Quetta Shura, that is made up of the supreme leader, his deputies, and around 20 other individuals. During the war, hethe Quetta Shura controlled Taliban forces and activities in southern and western provinces; another group, known as the Peshawar Shura, was responsible for the mainly eastern provinces. The Miram Shah Shura was headed by the Haqqani Network that were operational in the Loya Paktia region of eastern Afghanistan. On September 6, 2021, the Taliban announced the interim government of IEA. The makeup of the government demonstrates that the group has prioritized internal cohesion to create a balance of power between the different factions.
Key Interests & Priorities
1. Group Cohesion
Absent an external enemy, the Taliban regime could face the most serious threat from within. That is why the group must stay united in peace as they did in the war. In the past, the Taliban's ability to remain unified despite NATO efforts to fracture the organization was crucial to its effectiveness as an insurgency. Without a common enemy in either the US, NATO, or the western-backed government of Afghanistan, the Taliban have reportedly had disagreements between the three powerful factions and between moderate-conservative ideology. Now that the group is in power, its task of maintaining unity among its many distinct factions of varying ideological intensity and interests has become difficult. The factions have opposing viewpoints on how the new administration should govern in almost every aspect, such as inclusion, dealing with foreign fighters, the economy, and foreign affairs.
2. International Recognition
Since taking power in August 2021, the Taliban have sought international diplomatic recognition as Afghanistan's new authority and government. They have taken several procedural steps to that end, such as repeated encouragement of the foreign embassies, including the US and European countries, to return to Kabul. They have also engaged in high-level diplomacy with regional powers. More than a year into their rule, the Taliban government is not recognized by any country, including its historical partner - Pakistan. The Taliban expected regional powers, Pakistan, China, Russia, and other countries that continue to maintain a diplomatic presence in Kabul and with whom they have had political engagements for years to recognize their authority. However, neighboring countries maintain limited diplomatic and economic engagement, and are mainly concerned about containing insecurity within Afghanistan. Presently, low level Taliban diplomats are accredited alongside former republican diplomats at the embassies in Russia, China, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkmenistan, as well as in Qatar, Malaysia, and Saudi Arabia.
3. Consolidation of Power
The region and the world share a common concern that Afghanistan does not become a haven for terrorism and its territory used for terrorist activities against other countries. It is also one of the significant criteria the neighboring and other countries stipulated for the IEA's international recognition. For this reason and to consolidate power, the Taliban have assured the world they will not allow Afghan territory to be used to launch an attack on other countries. But the group continues to maintain ties with al Qaeda, TTP, and other jihadi terrorist groups. Al Zawahiri, the leader of al Qaeda, was housed in a house that belonged to Sirajuddin Haqqani before he was killed in a drone strike. Separately, consolidation of power is essential to the group fighting off competitors, whether militant Islamists such as ISKP or armed adversaries such as NRF. As the Taliban transitions from an insurgency to a state, they recognize the need to maintain law and order. Forming a conventional army appears to be one of the group’s security objectives, which is meant to reform their image as capable statesmen. However, the group has showcased and takes pride in having a brigade of elite suicide bombers.
4. Islamic Government
The Taliban do not yet have a clear vision of the structure of their state. Soon after taking over, they adopted unspecified parts of the monarchy's 1964 constitution that were not in conflict with Sharia law to rule the country. The constitution focuses on the country's religious dynamics while adhering to the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam. The Taliban have often used the term 'Islamic system' to describe their views on social norms and cultural values and have appointed an all-clerical leadership in the government. . Haibatullah Akhunzada is a Hadith scholar and is foremost concerned with implementing Sharia law. His hardliner policies have been unpopular and have hurt the group's efforts for international recognition, as evidenced by the revision of their decision to re-open girls' schools in March 2022, among other restrictive policies adopted towards women and girls. They continue to publicly caution that implementing social policy commitments requires security, resources, and time.