Uzbekistan
Profile
Like its other bordering neighbors, Afghanistan shares ties of ethnicity, culture, history, politics, and language with Uzbekistan. In the 1990s, Tashkent supported the militia of Afghan Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostum, whose forces provided a buffer zone to Uzbekistan from any encroaches by the Taliban that had cultivated a relationship with the newly founded Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Following the American invasion, Uzbekistan became an active participant in Afghanistan's US-led reconstruction and development, supplying it with electricity and engaging in various initiatives to promote economic connectivity. Although terrorism and extremism were major concerns for Tashkent, President Islam Karimov changed his stance and engaged in stabilization talks with the Taliban for short-term foreign policy goals. Uzbekistan established direct contacts with the leaders of the Taliban. For that reason, Uzbekistan kept its embassy open after the collapse of the western-backed Afghan government. The stabilization of humanitarian and political conditions and economic cooperation are at the forefront of Tashkent's interests relative to Afghanistan, especially after having increased investments in regional transportation infrastructure that connects it to the market in south Asia. Yet, it also wants to affirm its relevance and independence from Russian influence as it competes for regional hegemony with Kazakhstan. To achieve those long-term goals, Tashkent has engaged with the new Kabul regime, providing it with cheap electricity on loan and delivering humanitarian assistance.
Key Interests & Priorities
1. Spillover of Insecurity and International Terrorism
Religious extremism and radicalization remain significant challenges for Uzbekistan that have become more potent since the Taliban takeover. Uzbek nationals made up many of the militants that fought the U.S. and Afghan troops in Afghanistan. Central Asian capitals like Tashkent fear the militants might want to infiltrate their home countries. Takhar and Badakhshan provinces in Afghanistan house Tajik and Uzbek militants who fought alongside the Taliban. The IMU is a particularly potent threat to Uzbekistan and is reported to have fought alongside both Taliban and ISKP (the Taliban view ISKP as a threat). While the IMU formerly wanted to overthrow the government of President Karimov, they have espoused greater ambitions for creating an Islamic caliphate across Central Asia since pledging allegiance to the ISKP. Together with al Qaeda, the ISKP and IMU threaten regional security and stability. Uzbekistan wants Afghanistan to remain stable and prevent spillover of unrest. Central Asians have repeatedly asked the Taliban to contain spillover and suppress potential acts of terrorism against them. The Uzbek government sealed its border with Afghanistan immediately after the Taliban takeover. No Afghan refugees are allowed into the country. To address the neighbors' concerns, in February 2022, the Taliban announced the establishment of several new military units in three border provinces in the country's north, northeast, and west, deploying an estimated 4,400 additional troops in the region. In addition, the Taliban is worried about internal resistance to its rule from the opposition and former warlords that have had historical relations with Central Asian states. Despite border reinforcements, the ISKP fired ten rockets at an Uzbek military base in the border town of Termez on April 18, 2022. But Tashkent denied the claim on April 19, calling on Uzbek citizens to disregard what he called "provocations."
2. Economic Opportunities
Tashkent wants to safeguard economic connectivity, trade, and transit through a stable partner in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan intends to become a hub of regional connectivity by road, rail, and energy that includes Afghanistan and offers access to South Asia. It also hopes to become a transit hub for Russian and Chinese goods. Uzbekistan wants to pursue an export and tariff-oriented economy with access to major international transport corridors. The Uzbek national railway connects with the commercial hub of Mazar-e-Sharif in Afghanistan, extending beyond the border crossing of Hairatan. The line is planned to extend into Herat in western Afghanistan and on to Khwaf in Iran, connecting it to the Iranian railway system, essentially linking Central Asia to the Persian Gulf ports. Another planned line would connect Uzbekistan through Kabul to Peshawar, Pakistan, and onto the Arabia Sea ports. On May 12, 2022, Tashkent held a meeting on the trans-Afghan railway with representatives of Kazakhstan, Russia, Pakistan, and the Taliban. Uzbekistan is also a major energy supplier to Afghanistan, making up 57% of the country's imports. It is also part of the ADB-led TUTAP transmission line with plans to build the infrastructure to transport energy from Central to South Asia. Since the Taliban takeover, Afghanistan has been unable to pay, but Tashkent has deferred payment.
3. Inclusive Government
Despite having and urging greater engagement with the Taliban regime in power compared to other Central Asian republics, Uzbekistan refuses to recognize the new government in Kabul. Tashkent wants to move in concert with the international community with a collective voice and stance. The Uzbek authorities have emphasized the need for the formation of an inclusive government in Afghanistan and the Taliban's fulfillment of its promises. Tashkent and other Central Asian capitals fear the rise of terrorist threats to their countries from the rapid withdrawal of foreign troops, the ascendancy of the Taliban, and lack of representation and inclusivity in the government.